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 in Joseph V. Femia and Alasdair J. Marshall (eds), 2011, Beyond Disciplinary 
Boundaries: Essays on Pareto, Ashgate, Aldershot> 
Pareto, Mill and the cognitive explanation of collective beliefs. Unnoticed “middle-range 
theories” in the Trattato. 
by Alban Bouvier. 
0/ INTRODUCTION  
Sociology is a science in which there is neither an overarching theory to which all scientists 
are ready to commit (as is the case for biology), nor even a general mainstream to which most scholars 
belong (as is the case for economics). I am speaking here of sociology as a specific field in social 
science, whose boundaries with other fields, in particular ethnology and history, are indeterminate and 
quite controversial. In a context where no paradigm is prominent, it seems more relevant than in other 
sciences to return to the discipline‟s founding works. One can expect that important heuristic paths 
outlined by the pioneers were not explored in as much depth as they could have been early in the 
discipline‟s history. The investigation of only certain paths might have been favoured initially, which 
forever buried potentially productive modes of inquiry – perhaps for incidental reasons. Thus in 
sociology, since Talcott Parsons (1937), who seemed to have been aware of the risk of laying aside 
important heuristic ideas, a very common way of practicing theory has come to be through 
commenting on founders‟ works. Of course, this indirect way is not the only way to proceed in the 
development of social sciences. And Habermas (1984-7) was rightly reproached for restricting, unlike 
Parsons (1951), his interests in sociological theory to commentaries on founders‟ works. But no way 
should be neglected, however indirect and partial it may be. And Habermas was reproached above all 
not for having commented at length on Marx, Durkheim or G.-H. Mead, but for having failed to 
extract empirically testable analytical models.
1
  
Unlike Habermas, a few scholars have recently undertaken such work and have produced 
fruitful results, even regarding the works of the most renowned founders of social science whose 
views had been underestimated or neglected, either in theoretical sociology or in the philosophy of 
social phenomena. Thus certain historical commentaries have given birth to a specific analytical 
modelling of social phenomena. Jon Elster is one of these scholars. He has published very innovative 
rereadings of Marx (Elster, 1995) and Tocqueville (Elster, 1993) useful for political scientists. 
Raymond Boudon (1994) did similar work on various classical authors such as Weber and 
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Tocqueville, as well as Simmel. In particular, Boudon showed how productive some of Simmel‟s 
ideas are for contemporary sociology of knowledge and cognitive sociology. Finally, in a very 
different style distant from exegetic comments – but nonetheless analytical, as Elster‟s and Boudon‟s 
work is – Margaret Gilbert‟s (1989, 1994) rereading of classic authors such as Durkheim and Simmel 
on the elementary nature of groups is, according to many theoreticians, another exemplary way of 
reviving ideas that may have not been thoroughly investigated analytically in earlier scholarship. 
The prominent fathers of sociology who have not been as thoroughly reevaluated as Marx, 
Weber, Tocqueville or Durkheim have been, now deserve our special attention. Pareto is probably one 
of these founders whose sociological work still remains relatively little commented on. Turner, 
Beeghley and Powers (1981), Powers (1987), Boudon (1981,1994, 1999), Busino (1999), Bouvier 
(1992, 1995, 1999b, c, 2000), Femia (2006, 2009) and Marshall (2007), searching much more 
systematically than Talcott Parsons for analytical explanatory models in Pareto‟s work have taken 
such an approach. The aim of this paper is not to suggest that careful comments on Vilfredo Pareto‟s 
sociology could at last provide us with the “missing” overarching theory in sociology more than 
commentaries on Marx, Durkheim or any other classic author could. I argue that such a theory, if it is 
to exist, should consist of a number of micro-models, such as those Elster, Boudon and Gilbert, 
carefully constructed. These micro-models will look like what Merton (1957) called “middle-range 
theories”, whose concern is to help account for psychological mechanisms and social micro-
interactions from which larger social phenomena emerge (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998, Hedström 
and Bearman, 2009). What I claim is that Pareto has provided us with numerous micro-models in 
sociology, of which some are original, but to some extent still need to be evaluated. Besides, these 
“models” are generally far too vague in Pareto‟s Trattato di Sociologia Generale to be considered as 
conceptual models strictly speaking; they are rather just “schemas,” all almost very partially drawn. 
My specific goal in this paper is to try to transform these schemas into much clearer and more explicit 
conceptual models in order to better evaluate their empirical relevance, which implies making more 
conceptual distinctions than is common in comments on Pareto‟s sociology. To better evaluate the 
originality of Pareto‟s modeling, I will compare it to other social theorists‟. 
Even if it is probably not the real core of Pareto‟s sociology (Turner et al.,1981, and Powers, 
1987), the most original part of Pareto‟s Trattato deals with the very contemporary issues of the 
rationality of beliefs and the rationality of actions (Valade, 1990). These two latter issues are 
connected, given that many actions can be considered as rational or irrational depending on the 
rationality of the beliefs upon which they are based. I will concentrate in this paper on the sole issue of 
the rationality of beliefs, more precisely, collective beliefs. I do not contend that Pareto made a 
thorough examination of these general issues. Indeed, in the final part of this paper I will bring our 
attention to certain important limitations of Pareto‟s general account of collective beliefs. I also do not 
maintain that his analyses of singular examples were always profound, because clearly often they were 
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not, but that he gave probably the largest account that has ever been given of the various roles that 
justification of beliefs and actions (“argumentation”) can take within a sociological framework. Chaïm 
Perelman and Lucie Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969), along with contemporary argumentation theoreticians 
such as Toulmin (1958), Hamblin (1970), may have gone further in the investigation of certain micro-
mechanisms of argumentation. But neither scholar spoke in general of the issues of argumentation 
procedures within the framework of social science as broadly as Pareto did.  
I will proceed step by step, discussing several of the most widely accepted views of Pareto‟s 
theory of collective beliefs, arguing that each one is partial and too narrow. In each case, I will 
introduce new distinctions, which will result in a much broader view of Pareto‟s conception of beliefs. 
I will try to avoid Pareto‟s very idiosyncratic vocabulary as much as possible because, according to 
Pareto himself, this may be deeply misleading (Pareto, 1935, §119, 868)
2
. Furthermore, the meaning 
of Pareto‟s specific vocabulary varies largely in the Trattato depending on the specific context. On 
several occasions, I will prefer John Stuart Mill‟s wordings, generally clearer than Pareto‟s. At the end 
of this paper, I will even use one of Mill‟s specific psychological micro-models, because it turns out to 
be more refined and empirically more relevant than Pareto‟s models. By referring to Mill, who gave 
both a psychological and logical account of logical errors, I will remain very close to Pareto‟s 
programme. As Pareto himself wrote, after speaking of Mill, “It is the province of logic to tell why a 
reasoning is false. It is the business of sociology to explain its wide acceptance” (§1411). Pareto 
thought of his sociology as the complement of Mill‟s logic, (§ 1410-1412) but he seems to have 
underestimated the conceptual accuracy and the empirical relevance of psychological models involved 
in the System of Logic.
3
  
The careful investigation of Pareto‟s micro-models should lead us to re-read Pareto‟s Trattato 
di Sociologia Generale in the continuity of Mill‟s System of Logic and to emphasize the cognitive 
aspects of Pareto‟s sociology (Bouvier, 1992) counter to the usual ultra-emotivist interpretations 
(Aron, 1965). But it should also lead us also to re-evaluate the Machiavellian aspect of his thought, 
upon which many scholars have insisted for some time (Burnham, 1943, Fiorot, 1969, Femia 2006, 
Marshall, 2007), in favor of a more complex, less dissembling, and more communicative view of 
political, moral and religious discourses. The first two parts of this chapter will be devoted to the latter 
concerns and the remaining sections to the cognitive dimension. The issues, though, are related, in 
particular the role of emotions in beliefs and in actions. 
1. A CAUSALIST, IRRATIONALIST AND EMOTIVIST SOCIOLOGY OF BELIEFS? 
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One does not usually distinguish between different micro-theories or models (or middle-range 
theories) in Pareto‟s work, but rather interprets Pareto‟s sociological theory as one general theory. 
There are disagreements about the central meaning of this theory, but according to many scholars, 
Pareto‟s sociology explains that many actions – namely, those that are not technical actions based on 
scientific reasons or pragmatic actions which find their grounding in sound empirical information – are 
based on instinctive motivations alone. According to this interpretation, Pareto would claim that the 
beliefs or alleged beliefs that often accompany human behaviors and are supposed to justify them turn 
out to have no causal role at all in triggering these behaviors. Their sole real causes are instincts. It is 
why one could call such a theory a causalist theory, in opposition to a rationalist theory, which would 
claim that the reasons people give as explanations of their beliefs and/or actions are – or, at least may 
be – their true “causes.” At first sight, such a rationalist theory could be called “causalist” as well, 
since it envisions reasons as “causes.” But, in this latter case, “cause” is not used in its proper sense: 
what triggers behaviors (or actions as involving body movements) is necessarily composed of 
neurophysiological processes – and those are easier to figure out when one thinks of instincts than 
when one thinks of reasons. Besides, certain philosophers tend to support a dualist view of the mind, 
so although reasons motivate actions, these reasons cannot be called “causes” of actions in any sense 
(even in a weak sense): it would be a category mistake. This kind of dualist view was supported 
initially by Dilthey at the end of the 19
th
 century, but it was reformulated in the mid-20
th
 century by 
Wittgenstein in a more subtle – and now common – way (Winch, 1958).  
Without a doubt, one can find a causalist-“instinctualist” theory in certain passages of the 
Trattato. One could even argue that, in some contexts, Pareto seems to suggest that absolutely no 
belief allegedly supporting actions has any specific role in triggering behaviors or any mental 
mechanism: beliefs are merely by-products of the instinctive tendency to rationalize, namely to use 
reason without any specific reason (what Pareto calls the “instinct of combination” or the 1st class of 
“residues”, §972-5). Beliefs, then, are nothing more than “epiphenomena.” Such an extremist theory is 
clearly anti-functionalist in both a biological sense (see Malinowski‟s anthropology, for instance) and 
a sociological sense (as in Radcliffe-Brown‟s and Parsons‟s work)(Homans, 1941, 1950). For Pareto, 
rationalization helps frequently to fulfill neither individual needs nor social needs.  
One must notice that such an anti-functionalist account of certain beliefs has been 
rediscovered by authors such as Steven Pinker (1997) and Pascal Boyer (1994), especially in regard to 
religious beliefs in general and theology in particular. In such a view, religious beliefs are completely 
useless by-products of Darwinian evolution. More generally, such a theory resembles eliminativist 
views, which maintain that neither the notion of belief nor the notion of desire belong to the world of 
science (Churchland, 1984): rather they are merely commonsense explanations of behaviors, which are 
to be eliminated and replaced by purely neurophysiological explanations.
 
Anti-functionalism and 
eliminativism are variations, currently much debated, within the framework of causalist theories. In 
5 
Pareto‟s time, this rough outline of a theory was original. It has anticipated more contemporary 
conceptions. 
Pareto‟s sociological theory is sometimes called “irrationalist” to signal its extremist stance 
(Carroll, 1973, Boudon, 1986), in which reason does not play any role (“strong irrationalism”). That 
being said, it has been called “irrationalist” as well in a weaker sense (“weak irrationalism”). One 
could claim that conscious reason – which is necessary to plan actions carefully – often does not 
illuminate the preparations of actions, so that these actions may often lead to effects contrary to the 
goals (often self-interest) of those who have acted. Human actors are quite often “irrational” in this 
sense. Rational action, understood as conscious action based on the best available information and the 
attempt to reason as logically as possible – what Max Weber called Wertrationalität – is at least 
subjectively rational (actors expect their actions to achieve certain effects), even if it is not necessary 
objectively rational (bad information or effectively wrong reasoning results in effects other than those 
the actor has desired)(§160,541,855, 960). An action that is simultaneously subjective and objectively 
rational is rather rare: actors are often objectively irrational even if they are subjectively rational. The 
Trattato provides us with arguments for this much more moderate and more subtle theory than strong 
irrationalism. According to Pareto, the tendency to rationalize is sometimes actually quite valuable, for 
example, when it leads to actions based on well-informed arguments. Such arguments help humans 
avoid the bad consequences of the too-limited rationality of purely instinctive behaviors. It is what 
Pareto oddly calls “logical” actions, as opposed to “non-logical” actions (Pareto, 1935, Chapter II and 
Chapter III). 
Scholars have often suggested that Pareto‟s theory of action is “emotivist” because it seems to 
assume that instincts are accompanied or maybe even triggered by emotions (e.g., fear triggers the 
conservation instinct). Actually most of them, such as Aron (1965) and Boudon (1994, 1999), do not 
use the word “emotivist,” but their interpretation could nevertheless be called “emotivist.” Both insist 
on “feelings” as the real source of actions in Pareto. Boudon tends to think that Pareto‟s sociology is 
causalist, weakly irrationalist and emotivist without recognizing clear differences between these 
categories. I claim, on the contrary, that these conceptual distinctions make sense and that they 
facilitate the evaluation of the empirical relevance of Pareto‟s sociology. This wording has been used 
in the context of the still contemporary, more or less rough opposition, between “emotivist” (Carnap, 
1928, Ayer, 1936, Stevenson, 1937) and “cognitivist” (Toulmin, 1950) models. According to Carnap 
and Ayer, only scientific statements are based on reasons, while ethical and aesthetical statements are 
merely expressions of emotions.
4
 Toulmin argued, on the contrary, that ethics can be justified by 
reasons. It must be granted that Pareto does not stray too far from this kind of emotivist view. 
However, given that Pareto firmly distinguishes between instincts and emotions, it would be more 
                                                          
4
 See the general rediscovering of the role of emotions in cognition itself (e.g. Damasio, 1994). 
6 
accurate to say that Pareto‟s theory is “instinctualist”.5 According to Pareto, this narrow theory of 
action – or more precisely, of behavior – is valid for all animals and not only for humans (§155,156). 
Humans are different from other animals (or at least from most other animals) only to the extent that 
most of their actions are accompanied (and justified) by beliefs or alleged beliefs (§157). Again, one 
must agree that the Trattato includes such an emotivist - or rather instinctualist – theory (§850, 868).   
However, when we consider Pareto‟s general sociology, we find that it turns out to be mixed 
and to have both emotivist and cognitivist aspects. In the remaining sections of this paper I will focus 
on the cognitivist aspects of Pareto‟s sociology, which have been much underestimated in the existing 
scholarship. These new aspects consist of heuristic micro-models (or middle-range theories) closer to 
current psychological theories. Nevertheless, it is necessary to clearly first mark out the room allocated 
to instincts in Pareto‟s sociology of beliefs. 
2. AN EXPRESSIVIST AND COMMUNICATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF BELIEFS? 
Expression, dissimulation and communication.  
According to one of the most widely shared views, Pareto‟s theory of action states that many 
human actions are not just “accompanied” by beliefs that do not play any role (as the eliminativist 
interpretation contends), but that these beliefs dissimulate the instinctual source and express an 
instinctual source different from the genuine source. Of course, this view is not incompatible with the 
eliminativist view: whereas many beliefs may be just epiphenomal by-products, many others may 
express/dissimulate instincts, and, as a result, play a role in the process of communication.   
Actually, the theory of dissimulation is more often attributed to Pareto than the theory of 
expression. However these two (middle-range) theories are as complementary as the recto and the 
verso of a sheet of paper. Pareto provides many examples of this kind of beliefs, those that express 
certain instincts but dissimulate the genuine ones. Numerous examples are borrowed from political 
contexts. For instance, Pareto writes that politicians rarely try to persuade citizens to vote for them by 
invoking a love of power, for this would appear cynical. Rather, politicians claim that their goal is to 
serve the nation, and they attempt to make people believe that they seek the public good (§854). In 
certain cases, they may even succeed in persuading themselves that they are really motivated by such 
finer feelings (§854). Pareto does not deny that there is an “instinct” of solidarity in humans and in 
certain animals or other altruistic instincts such as compassion, and he suggests that these instincts 
might sometimes genuinely support the claim to believe in the value of solidarity and be the genuine 
source of action (§1138, 1142, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1148, 1150). Nonetheless, in the same passages, he 
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says that invoking these instincts as the genuine source of one‟s own behavior is often both false and 
misleading, either deliberately (the alleged “beliefs” are merely apparent beliefs, both false and 
insincere) or involuntarily (the alleged beliefs, although objectively false _ because the genuine  
source is self-interest_ are nevertheless sincere) (§854). This account of beliefs is very close to La 
Rochefoucauld‟s, Nietzsche‟s and other classic authors. We might recall, for example, Marx‟s analysis 
of the self-interested motivations of the French delegates voting for the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man in Capital (1887, p. 518). Pareto even envisions cases in which the sexual instinct is the real 
source of certain actions, but is dissimulated by an idea that expresses a completely different instinct, 
e.g. a call for chastity (priests who continually discuss chastity in their sermons may actually be 
obsessed by sexuality) (§852). Here Pareto is close to Freud. Globally speaking, one can conclude 
from these comparisons that Pareto‟s expressivist/dissimulationist theory of beliefs is not especially 
original. Nevertheless, this theory is different from eliminativist, anti-functionalist or purely 
instinctualist views since the expression of beliefs plays an effective role, actually a communicative 
role, either in indicating to other people the genuine source of actions or dissimulating the source and 
subsequently misleading people. 
 One can notice that Pareto is not very explicit on the idea that beliefs may express genuine 
instincts; rather Pareto emphasizes the idea of dissimulation. Commentators have claimed, therefore, 
that his sociology resembles the Machiavellan conception of political ideologies. They are right but, 
unlike these commentators, my central aim in this chapter is to extract from Pareto‟s sociology micro-
models whose significance has been neglected or underestimated, precisely because they were less 
explicit in the Trattato. 
Yet Pareto‟s theory is explicitly expressivist on another important aspect, since Pareto argues 
that humans need to express their feelings or instincts by external actions, if not explicitly by a kind of 
very specific action that one might call the discursive action of justification. Thus Pareto identifies a 
specific class of « residues »: “the need to express one’s feelings by external actions” (§888 and 
§1189-1112). This expressivist model focuses on the expressivity of actions much more than on the 
expressivity of discourse, but Pareto has less elaborated on this specific point than Malinowski. Thus, 
Malinowski (1922) describes at great length the importance of magical rituals (more than mere words) 
as a way of expressing deep feelings. . 
Residues as instincts or primitive motivations. As mentioned previously, interpreters seem 
frequently to neglect that, according to Pareto, all beliefs are not necessarily false or insincere. True 
and sincere beliefs may exist. Pareto is ready to recognize that there may be genuine altruistic (§1148, 
§1152, 5°) or chaste behaviors (§1163, 1165, 1166, 11787); this is clear given Pareto‟s classification 
of what he prefers to call “residues” (what I have until now referred to as “instincts” for pedagogical 
reasons). We have also suggested that Pareto‟s conception of beliefs was probably influenced by 
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Mill‟s System of Logic. Commentators on Pareto‟s sociological theory have not often noticed, at least 
to my knowledge, that Mill also uses the word “residue” in his account of scientific method. Pareto 
very probably borrows this term from Mill, as he does the word “derivation” (to be discussed shortly), 
although Pareto intends the words to have different meanings from Mill‟s usage.6 Let us now turn our 
attention to the general idea that “residue” is a methodological term and to the fact that Pareto prefers 
to speak of “residue” rather than of “instincts” for methodological reasons.  
Pareto often uses the term “residue” in the framework of the previous micro-theory; in 
particular, he uses the term when he claims that beliefs are the mere by-products of instincts that have 
the capacity to dissimulate the real source of actions. In fact, when these beliefs (or rather alleged 
beliefs) are analyzed and reduced, what remains are the “residues” of analysis (§851,862). The real 
source of actions, then, is merely instincts. But because these instincts have not been discovered 
directly, but only via the analysis of beliefs expressed in discursive reasoning, Pareto does not contend 
that he has given a correct account of them that might be comparable to what a neurologist or a 
psychologist using other methods could produce (§851, 852). He uses only what is sufficient to take 
beliefs or alleged beliefs into account within a sociological framework. This may help explain why 
Pareto does not try to reduce the numerous residues-instincts (six classes divided in many sub-classes) 
to a smaller number, as does Freud for drives (only two: sexual drive vs instinct of preservation; or 
later: Eros vs Thanatos).  
Pareto never makes any reference to Mills‟ Method of Residue, one of the four scientific 
Methods with the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference and the Method of Concomitant 
Variations (Mill, 1963, Book III, Chapter VIII). However the process I have described as Pareto‟s 
method is very close to the Method of Residue, which Mill illustrates by examples drawn from 
Astronomy, Physics or Chemistry if not from Psychology or Sociology (Mill, 1963, Book III, Chapter 
VIII, §5). Because the term “residue” is a methodological term, Pareto can use it in other contexts, yet 
it takes on different meanings in those new contexts. It is a mistake to state that residues always deal 
with instincts; even more important, we cannot say that residues always deal with emotions. Some 
classical authors, such as Parsons (1936), as well as a few historians of sociological theory, such as 
Turner, Beeghley and Powers (1981, pp. 386-90), have clearly observed as much; I will attempt to 
confirm their insights shortly. 
These residues are, if not the ultimate source of action or the ultimate principles of action, at 
least close to them. Pareto could have used this very phrasing (“ultimate principles”), and then 
followed Mill‟s usage. In fact, Mill makes a distinction between derivative laws and primitive laws, 
which he sometimes calls ultimate laws or ultimate principles (Mill, 1963, Book III, Ch. XIV, §1; Ch. 
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XV, §3, etc.). He specifies that the primitive laws or principles can be discovered by backward 
reasoning from derivative laws. Mill‟s notion of law is very close to the notion of cause. Indeed, if we 
ignore the exact wording (in terms of “laws”), Pareto resembles Mill even more closely. Pareto also 
seems to have isolated “instincts” through a process of backward reasoning. Pareto most likely began 
his research by considering certain effects or expressions (“derivative principles”) of instincts and then 
attempted to find their cause or source (“primitive - or ultimate - principles”) (§886). At the same time, 
Pareto seems to have thought that genuine ultimate principles – “instincts” - probably lie beyond 
residual instincts – because, after all, he arrived at a discussion of residual instincts only indirectly. 
Derivations as derivative motivations in Mill-Pareto’s model. Pareto calls the justifications of 
beliefs “derivations” (or sometimes “derivative”, §868, 879-880, 1397). But Pareto often uses the 
word “residues”  and the word “derivation” in so different meanings, depending on contexts, that what 
is called “residues” from a certain aspect can be viewed as “derivation” from another (e.g., §877, 882). 
Thus, I would like to claim that the use of the term “derivation” to designate beliefs or alleged beliefs 
not only is useless for us at the present stage in this account of Pareto‟s theory of actions and beliefs 
but even misleading. One could surely say here, following Mill‟s usage, that some instincts are less 
primitive than others, and consequently are “derivative,” – for example, self-interest preservation of 
individual integrity might be more primitive than solidarity (§1138-9, §1152) – although Pareto does 
not use the term “derivation” and “derivative” in this sense when he refers to residues as instincts (as 
we will soon see, he uses these same words in other contexts). When Mill speaks of the properties of 
objects, he makes a distinction between primitive (or, more exactly, ultimate) properties and derivative 
properties, and takes the example of chemical bodies (Mill, 1963, Book I, Chapter 7, §6; Book III, 
Chap. 20, §2). One of Mill‟s main concerns in this context is to account for what is now called the 
emergence (and sometimes the “supervenience”) of properties upon others. Mill sometimes speaks of 
the “generation” or the “production” of these proprieties in place of “derivation,” as if these words 
were interchangeable. But again, the classification of “residues” (namely instinctual residues) does not 
make any clear reference to this idea. Although Pareto seems to be sometimes close to such a 
viewpoint (§876), he never speaks explicitly of elementary instincts, nor does he mention 
“compounds” of elementary instincts (§ 888. Bouvier, 1992, n. 19 p. 355-6).   
One could also argue, extending some of Pareto‟s seminal ideas within Mill‟s conceptual 
framework, that certain instinctual residues (or motivational principles) are more primitive than others 
but that derivative (motivational principles) are invoked more often because they are more readily 
accepted by human society (§854). Without any reference to Pareto, Elster (1999) has recently 
envisaged how feelings can transform themselves into other feelings. We could say, then, that some 
feelings are primitive and others are derivative, at least functionally. 
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To conclude our examination of this account, let us take up the notion of residue as an 
indication of one methodological way by which the real source of actions can be discovered, and let us 
lay aside the notion of derivation, as it is misleading in this framework – except if we use it in the 
manner Mill used it. In this case, some instincts (discovered through the Method of Residues) are 
primitive and others are derivative. One might even add that the former kind of instincts might be said 
to be more residual than the latter, since backward reasoning should lead us from the latter to the 
former.  
Finally, we have to notice that, unlike the eliminativist account in particular, Pareto‟s 
expressivist/dissimulationist account of beliefs in relation to instincts attaches a communicative value 
to beliefs expressed in discourse. 
3. A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF BELIEFS AS INVOLVING LOGICAL DEDUCTIONS 
In numerous passages, Pareto does not focus on the emotive (or instinctual) dimension of 
beliefs, but on the contrary, on their cognitive – more precisely, their logical – dimension (1405-1418, 
1543-1686). This viewpoint converges with a conception of residues as either moral principles or 
metaphysical/physical principles. 
A/ Residues as primitive moral principles and derivations as derivative moral principles in 
Mill-Pareto’s model.  
According to a more refined view than the “instinctualist” view of Pareto‟s theory of beliefs 
and actions (which we examined in the previous sections), Pareto‟s viewpoint deals more with an 
account of  moral standards or common moral principles, which vary depending on groups and 
societies, than with a search for instinctual (and universal) principles. According to this model just 
outlined in the Trattato, what motivates action are not mere instincts but rather moral principles, 
which require consciousness although instincts are unconscious. Nevertheless, Pareto remains 
ambiguous on this point. In fact, Pareto often speaks of “moral feelings,” which could refer either to 
instinctual emotions corresponding to moral virtues like pity or compassion, or to moral principles 
themselves. He also speaks of “moral feelings” and “moral principles” as if the terms were 
interchangeable (§1113-1206). Of course, one might say that altruism is based either on the instinct of 
solidarity, or that it is based on an explicit moral imperative requiring one to exhibit solidarity. As 
mentioned earlier, Parsons and Powers have rightly focused on the moral use of the word “residue,” 
but Parsons did it so much that he has tended to understand residues as nothing more than moral 
principles – in complete opposition to the most common commentaries on the subject.  
The reducibility of moral principles to moral feelings has been a vexing philosophical issue 
since at least Kant‟s day, and the discussion is still lively. According to one common conception, 
which resembles Hume‟s thought closely, morality follows spontaneous tendencies. According to a 
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second line of reasoning, closer to Kant‟s, true morality is duty – in which action does not follow 
tendencies but has to work against them. In this view, morality begins only when one exhibits 
altruistic behavior to people for whom one does not feel any sympathy. It is clear that Pareto does not 
believe in Kant‟s account of morality. Furthermore, Pareto maintains that moral principles express 
only spontaneous tendencies; consequently, moral principles are reducible to tendencies. Nevertheless, 
he turns out to be also very much interested in analyzing the actual content of moral theories. 
In this context, Pareto again uses the word « residue », as well as the word « derivation », but 
he uses them in two different senses. Let us now focus on one meaning only.  According to Mill‟s 
usage (yet Mill does not use these words for moral examples in the System of Logic), if the residue is a 
primitive moral principle, for example, “Stand in solidarity with others,” the derivation would be 
constituted of the logical consequences of this general principle, allowing it to apply to particular 
situations (e.g., “Send money to Haitians so they may survive after the earthquake”). Pareto, however, 
is not concerned with the particular logical consequences (“derivations” in Mill‟s sense) of such a 
general principle. He is concerned with the account for the varieties of moral systems in the human 
world _ there is Kant‟s ethics, but also Christian Ethics, Muslim Ethics, Utilitarian Ethics (such as 
Mill‟s Ethics), Stoicism, Epicureanism and a multiplicity of tribal Ethics _ whose goal is to justify this 
kind of principle itself, so that this moral principle (“Stand in solidarity with others”) turns out to be a 
logical consequence of more primitive principles. It is these deductions that Pareto calls “derivations.” 
The use of the term “derivation” here is an example of Pareto‟s indeterminate use of concepts. In fact, 
the statement “Stand in solidarity with others” might be viewed, if we consider it in light of certain 
lexical uses of the words in the Trattato, merely the expression of an (instinctual) residue (§ 970, § 
1113-1206). According to other lexical uses in the Trattato, however, the same statement would be 
viewed as a derivation understood as a logical consequence of alleged more primitive principles 
(either theological, like in Christianism, or political, like in Marxism, or metaphysical, magical, 
etc…)(§ 863, §1414, §1416, etc.).  
Even if Pareto does not refer to Mill as much as he could have, it is nonetheless remarkable 
that his thought bears a striking resemblance to other aspects of Mill‟s thought. It is even more 
surprising that Pareto fails to refer to a famous example in the System of Logic, an example which 
would have served to illustrate his argument. In that passage, Mill (1963, Book II, Chapter III, §3) 
refers to Lord Mansfield‟s famous advice to a juror who did not know the morals and laws of the 
country where he would be staying: “Try to judge according to your deepest intuitions but above all 
get out of any justification of your judgment.” In other words, the juror‟s judgment would probably be 
fair, but his justifications would surely be wrong. Pareto, for his part, writes: “in non- scientific 
reasoning, what usually happens is that abandoned premises are replaced by new ones – one residue 
gives way to other residues” (§ 1416, 2°). Pareto refers to various examples, especially moral 
examples. For example, Theist premises may take the place of Catholic premises, and if these 
12 
premises are abandoned, they in turn may be replaced by Marxist premises. Nonetheless, the logical 
consequences will roughly be the same in every culture (e.g. lying, thievery, and murder are prohibited 
in every culture, except in particular circumstances which are always more or less the same, such as 
self-defence). We might take note of the fact that Mill‟s and Pareto‟s skepticism about the general 
justifications of moral judgments is in line here with Hume, and it should also remind us of Aristotle‟s 
casuistic ethics (as opposed to Kant‟s ethics). As such, Pareto‟s account of moral and juridical 
reasoning is not especially original.   
Within the framework of this sociological theory of moral beliefs as logical deductions (or 
“derivations”), Pareto makes a further distinction between simple deductions or derivations, and 
complex deductions or derivations, meaning that both may have exactly the same normative 
conclusions. He takes the example of Marxism, of which more or less sophisticated versions exist. It 
goes without saying that The Capital is much more complex than The Communist Party Manifesto, but 
the normative message of both texts is nevertheless the same (§1416). Pareto writes that more 
sophisticated versions serve only to lend intellectual authority to the author‟s conclusions. This means 
that such works are not useless, since they are more easily accepted by cultured people. Pareto does 
not elaborate further on this point, but one can infer that the instinct to rationalize is probably stronger 
in certain people. Therefore, such people need more complicated justifications (derivations) to be 
satisfied. To restate what we have said previously, Pareto‟s account of collective moral beliefs is quite 
close to Malinowski‟s account of cultural variety. Malinowski (1926) tended to think that common 
sense in the evaluation of behaviors is universally widespread, more so than it might seem at first 
glance. Nonetheless, the beliefs that justify behaviors vary according to cultural and historical context.  
Within the framework of this same micro-theory that seems to emerge here, Pareto notices that 
one can observe both a call for the defense of the integrity of one‟s own person, and a call for 
compassion towards other people. According to Pareto, this suggests that residues as instincts act in 
opposition to one another, and residues as moral principles do so as well  (§888). Jon Elster (1999) has 
emphasized this aspect in his recent work. Elster cites traditional proverbs to show how justifications 
for behaviors are so incredibly varied that for every proverb recommending a certain course of action, 
another proverb that advises exactly the opposite behavior can be found.   
Pareto also adds that most principles that seem to be quite radical in principle (for example, “It 
is forbidden to kill anyone”), may include exceptions under certain circumstances (for example, one 
might kill another person in order to save one‟s life, or in defense of one‟s country) (§1558). These 
exceptions, however, will be explicitly specified only when one is confronted with such circumstances 
(§1558). Of course, it is always easy to be insincere and, like the Jesuits, to add ad hoc exceptions that 
promote one‟s own self-interest when moral principles obstruct the accomplishment of one‟s goals. 
Furthermore, moral principles may seem significantly more different than they actually are if one 
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remains attached to merely ideological principles instead of to effective principles. Again, Pareto‟s 
statements are close to Malinowski‟s (1926).  
B/ Residues as metaphysical (or physical) principles and derivations as metaphysical (or 
physical) or normative logical consequences. A more general sociological theory of beliefs _ 
normative or not _ as logical deductions. 
Depending on the context, Pareto focuses on very different aspects of beliefs, which helps 
explain why numerous outlines of micro-models or middle-range theories can be found in the Trattato. 
Thus, according to the previous account, as partial as the other ones, of course, primitive principles of 
which logical conclusions can be derived are always moral principles, possibly expressing moral 
instincts.  
But now the most important point, compared to what has been stated above, is that the 
principles of which moral conclusions such as the appeal to solidarity or the interdiction of killing are 
drawn are not necessary themselves moral principles. This proves, once again, that residues are not 
reducible to moral principles or moral feelings – but Pareto calls them “residues” as well. He is 
speaking here of a “metaphysical residue” (§1414), for example, regarding the existence of a god as a 
principle upon which the interdiction of murder is based.   
Compared to other anthropological theories, Pareto does not stray far from naturalist views. 
However, Pareto does not give any explanation of the origin of ideas such as God or other religious 
ideas. On the contrary, Pascal Boyer (1994), a contemporary anthropologist who does not focus on the 
explanation of moral justifications, but rather on religious ideas, sets forth an original idea on this 
subject. Boyer does not argue that all religious ideas are based on the same universal primitive ideas – 
which might be in line with Pareto‟s general views on collective beliefs, but seems hard to 
demonstrate according to most anthropologists, given the great variations in religious beliefs. Instead, 
Boyer argues, on the contrary, that all religious beliefs are based on the same cognitive mechanism 
tending to violate these universal basic ideas or these primitive “categorizations”, such as the belief 
that a stone cannot fly and does not need to eat because a stone is a mineral object and that such 
objects cannot fly and do not need to eat. This issue remains open for debate, although it is not certain 
that Boyer‟s account is as original as it seems at first glance. Nonetheless, Boyer provides us at least 
with a more precise and developed discussion of the already common idea that religious ideas are 
concerned with “supernature” (supernatural entities), that is: they deal with a kind of causality 
different from natural causality (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, 1965).   
Although Pareto does not say anything as explicit on the supernatural, he does take note of the 
fact that when people refer to God or other supernatural entities such as Poseidon, they do not 
renounce their more rational beliefs according to scientific criteria. Thus, sailors continue to repair 
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their ships even if they use protective magic also. All empirical anthropologists, from Malinowski 
(1922) to Evans-Pritchard (1937), have written about the same phenomenon. Evans-Pritchard wrote, 
with language very similar to Lévy-Bruhl‟s (1910), that many people believe that there are two kinds 
of causality, natural and supernatural, and that they do not conflict. The latter merely complements the 
former. If Pareto would have elaborated a little more on that point, he would probably have said that 
supernatural explanations are complex and various derivations, while natural explanations are simple 
and more or less universal explanations. Evans-Pritchard (1965) mentioned that Pareto‟s and Lévy-
Bruhl‟s intuitions were very similar but that Pareto thought that supernatural or magic explanations 
can be found even in occidental and allegedly rationalist countries.  
 4. A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF BELIEFS AS CONSEQUENCES OF INVALID YET CONVINCING 
LOGICAL DEDUCTIONS.  
 The previous section turned our attention to the theory of collective beliefs outlined in the 
Trattato, and focused on comparisons between various deductive justifications. In this model, the 
logical validity of these deductions is not under discussion. Pareto compares the different content of 
logical premises that nonetheless leads to the same conclusions, or he compares premises whose core 
content is identical, but which differ greatly in their degree of complexity, and yet lead to the same 
conclusions. The greatest part of the chapter X of the Trattato (§1543-1686), however, is devoted to 
the examination of the numerous invalid logical deductions that one may encounter in the examination 
of justifications of collective beliefs. This new investigation can give birth to a still slightly different 
(middle-range) theory of beliefs. I claim that this theory is the most original part of Pareto’s general 
theory of collective beliefs. And I argue that this theory is still stronger if one introduces Mill‟s 
psychological views, which are more refined. Those views are now being rediscovered by 
contemporary experimental cognitive psychologists, but still neglected by sociologists. I will set forth 
these ideas in the next two sections. 
 Pareto devotes hundreds of pages to what he calls “verbal derivations” (or “verbal proofs”), 
which are justifications of beliefs comprising logically invalid deductions (§ 1543-1686). To be more 
precise, not only does Pareto speak of justifications that are logically invalid, but he also speaks of 
justifications that are logically valid but are based on empirically false premises. Of this latter kind is 
the belief that Poseidon exists; that he plays a (supernatural) role in the genesis of storms; that he is 
sensitive to human prayers and rituals; and, consequently, that it is wise to pray to Poseidon and make 
relevant rituals before departing on a sea-going voyage. Mill also makes this distinction in his System 
of Logic, in the book entitled “On Fallacies” (Book V). Malinowski and Evans Pritchard – and even 
Levy-Bruhl – cite examples very similar to Pareto‟s. But Pareto is the only one of the four who 
focuses on logically invalid justifications, and is also the only one to be in line with Mill (§1410-2), 
following Hume. I argue that Pareto‟s most original idea is that most beliefs are irrational in a very 
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specific sense, that of logical invalidity. This account of beliefs differs even from Lévy-Bruhl‟s 
account of primitive collective ideas as “pre-logic” since “pre-logic” in Lévy-Bruhl‟s thought does not 
mean “not logic”. It merely means that the premises of (valid) deductions include some kind of 
reference to supernatural entities and properties
 
 
Many contemporary psychologists since Tversky, Kahneman and Slovic (1980), and Nisbett 
and Ross (1980), have focused attention on the very numerous logical mistakes that everyone – even 
logicians or statisticians – commits in everyday life, sometimes with serious consequences. For 
example, a physician might incorrectly interpret medical tests and conclude that a patient is suffering 
from AIDS or another very serious illness, when in fact that is not the case. Further investigations 
have shown that these common mistakes are far less frequent than first experimentalists believed. 
Many of them appear only within experimental contexts, so that many of the alleged logical mistakes 
can be taken as experimental biases (Gigerenzer, 2000). Nonetheless, many mistakes remain. In any 
case, all treatises of logic from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill include an examination of logical 
mistakes, yet further proof that they do exist. Indeed, Gigerenzer explained the existence of logical 
fallacies rationally by showing that the most frequent logical fallacies are merely by-products of 
heuristics that were the most valuable in the dangerous environments where our ancestors lived. (They 
provided faster results than more careful reasoning). Nonetheless it does not change the fact that the 
mind produces such mistakes. 
Pareto does not use the “principle of charity” in Davidson‟s sense (Davidson, 1982), which 
enjoins the social scientist to suppose, a priori, that even if a belief or an action seems strange, the 
believer or the actor had good reasons to believe or act as he did. In consequence, often Pareto 
commits biases comparable to laboratory biases encountered by psychologists. On many occasions, for 
example, when Pareto investigates the reasoning of classical philosophers like Plato, Rousseau, Kant, 
and Hegel, one can easily claim that the supposed invalid reasoning diagnosed by Pareto is actually 
valid in almost every case if one interprets the phrasing correctly (§1507, 1514-22, 1556, 1682). 
Nevertheless, certain kinds of reasoning still involve logical mistakes, at least if one uses the principle 
of charity only as a heuristic rule of interpretation and not as a rationalist dogma. In fact, Pareto is 
fully aware that it is often easy to transform defective reasoning into correct reasoning by introducing 
new premises, stating that they were implicit (§1405-9), or by restricting the scope of another premise 
(§1558), or by changing the meaning of a term (§1556-1613), and so on. Of course, Pareto is right 
here in arguing that these devices may be fully insincere, and that the one who made the mistake 
simply did not want to admit that he was wrong. But we must consider each case individually. In any 
case, Pareto‟s attempt to investigate the role of the most frequent fallacies in societies is both an 
original and a relevant research program (§1411).  
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Among the numerous historical examples of fallacies that he analyses, Pareto investigates at 
length the fallacies of composition and division (also termed “fallacy of distribution” or “fallacy of 
apportionment”) (§1495-6). And yet Pareto is often more inclined to give brief sketches of these many 
examples rather than to analyze some of them carefully or show their historical significance. Albert 
Hirschman (1977), on the contrary, has brilliantly shown how frequent these fallacies have been used 
both to justify and refute capitalism. I have personally tried to show that one particular kind of fallacy 
(that went unnoticed by Pareto), a fallacy, that since the Stoics, has been called “the lazy argument,” 
appears in very different contexts, from common interpretations of Calvinism to common 
interpretations of Marxism (Bouvier, 1999b).  
I argue that this specific micro-model or “middle-range theory” in Pareto‟s sociology of 
beliefs has been seldom recognized because it has often been confused with the dissimulationist theory 
of beliefs, which is yet another middle-range theory (see above). A dissimulationist theory can still be 
discerned here, in a sense, but what remains hidden are not feelings or instincts but rather 
metaphysical, physical or normative principles. Furthermore, what covers over these principles are not 
other feelings or instincts but logico-linguistic tricks. This is a significant difference because these 
kinds of dissimulations are independent. In particular, certain justifications (e.g. invoking solidarity), 
may dissimulate the genuine motivations (e.g. self-interest), without using logically invalid reasoning 
and linguistic tricks (“Send money to Haitians so they may survive after the earthquake” can be 
justified - and logically deduced – from the general principle “Stand in solidarity with others”, 
although this principle may dissimulate the genuine principle: “Be recognized as generous if you want 
to become a political leader”). Other justifications dissimulate genuine motivations by using logico-
linguistic fallacies (e.g. using the word “solidarity” in different senses, § 1557, or the fallacy of 
division, § 1497); they are twice misleading. 
5. A RETURN TO THE CAUSALIST AND RATIONALIST THEORY OF BELIEFS, AND TO ITS 
COMMUNICATIVE DIMENSION 
These two last theories of beliefs open the way for further interrogations into the nature of 
Pareto‟s general viewpoint. Indeed, Pareto gives us an explanation of the logical mistake that is in 
accordance  with the first theory we have explained, that is, the instinctualist or emotivist theory. 
References to contemporary debates can also help us here. Nisbett and Ross (1980) wonder about the 
origins of logical mistakes, but take for granted that such mistakes exist and that they are not created 
only by methodological biases. For pedagogical reasons, they argue that in this respect there are two 
kinds of theories, “hot” and “cold.” Advocates of hot theories contend that logical mistakes are caused 
by emotions: it is when people are stressed or tired, for example, that they commit logical mistakes. 
Proponents of cold theories argue that logical mistakes are caused by cognitive biases, namely strong 
cognitive tendencies, such as heuristics permitting people to think by following ways that are 
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particularly rapid and generally right but that can be misleading in certain specific cases. Pareto 
explicitly supports a hot theory on these matters. When he sets forth his view on this issue, he refers to 
Mill, but strangely he attributes a view to Mill that is obviously not Mill‟s own (§1410;1412), showing 
that he read Mill very quickly (Bouvier, 1995, 1997). It is a pity, because Mill‟s view is much more 
elaborated than Pareto‟s and may perhaps be even more in accordance with the great varieties of 
models that Pareto, in fact, provides. In reality, Mill‟s psychological account of logical mistakes is a 
mixed theory. Mill argues that, on the one hand, emotional causes and, on the other hand, intellectual 
or cognitive causes, have to be connected: emotions may play a role, but emotions cannot produce 
logical mistakes if a kind of autonomous cognitive weakness does not exist already (Mill, 1963, Book 
V, Chapter 1, § 3). Psychology, then, should investigate both kinds of causes. 
A consequence of this kind of analysis, which I will take as well-founded without having room 
to prove it (Bouvier, 1992, 1995), is that justifications of beliefs, whether true or false – false for 
logical or empirical reasons – must have an effective role in the perseveration or transformation of 
collective beliefs. In such a way, the communicative theory of beliefs (see above) is enriched by a 
more complete causalist theory, in which reasons, even false reasons, play a role.  
 6/ THE LIMITS OF PARETO’S ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE BELIEFS 
 To conclude, I will point out only two limitations to Pareto‟s theory – or theories rather, since 
Pareto‟s account of collective belief is not systematic and he provides only micro-models or “middle-
range theories” in Robert Merton‟s sense. 
 First, although Pareto takes argumentation into account, he investigates fallacies almost 
exclusively. What is worse, when he encounters argumentative procedures such as analogies, he views 
them only as tricks, even though they could play a positive pedagogical role in the explanation of new 
ideas (without speaking of their heuristic role, which historians of science such as Mary Hesse (1966) 
have proved). The same could be said of other procedures such as what Bakhtin (1984) calls 
polyphony, which Pareto  notices in interpretations of the Song of Songs in the Bible (“St Jerome (…) 
assumes without trace of proof that the author is not speaking of himself when he recommends 
conviviality at table”,§1629). Perelman‟s Treatise on argumentation (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, 
1958) enriched by more contemporary investigations, would be a better guidebook than Pareto‟s 
Trattato for the analysis of argumentation procedures because it is less repetitive and more systematic. 
Furthermore, better examples of applications to historically significant ideas can be found elsewhere 
than in Pareto‟s writings. Hirschman (1977) has shown, in a famous book I already mentioned, that 
logically valid arguments played a role in the transformation of prominent collective feelings or 




 centuries, leading young men to seek their self-interest rather than glory 
and honor. 
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 Second, and more important, Pareto provides a very narrow analysis of collective beliefs as 
collective. Collective beliefs in the Trattato are merely widespread beliefs – that is, beliefs that many 
individuals have objectively in common. But Pareto does not elucidate the process by which certain 
beliefs are viewed by folks as constitutive of their community. And he does not investigate either the 
various processes by which people may feel socially forced to publicly accept certain ideas they do not 
personally accept. Both Tocqueville and Durkheim have given us much deeper understanding  of 
collective beliefs from these viewpoints. An examination of their ideas is outside the scope of the 
present paper.  Returning to works introduced at the beginning of this paper, I want to put forward the 
idea that both Margaret Gilbert  and Jon Elster have provided illuminating analyses of collective 
beliefs based either on Durkheim (and the notion of “joint commitment”) (Gilbert, 1989) or on 
Tocqueville (and the notion of “pluralistic ignorance”) (Elster, 2007). 
 To conclude, I claim that Pareto‟s sociology of collective beliefs contains numerous outlines 
of heuristic micro-models or “middle-range” theories of collective beliefs whose heuristic significance 
has been underestimated. Generally speaking, scholars have insisted on irrationalist, instinctualist and 
emotivist dimensions of Pareto‟s account. A re-reading of the Trattato in line with Mill‟s System of 
Logic enhances its cognitive dimensions, quite underestimated. However one is far from an 
overarching theory of collective beliefs, not only because Pareto‟s views still remain too narrow, but 
also because his views are not systematical:  the various micro-models are not set up in a systematic 
theory. Above all, in order to speak of middle-range theories in Merton‟s proper sense, this 
examination should be complemented by case studies. But this task oversteps the scope of this paper.    
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